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The effect of international
environmental institutions:
how we might learn more
Thomas Bernauer
When is successful international collaboration possible? Can policymakers or
other actors in international relations do something to facilitate cooperation,
and if so, what? These questions, which are fundamental both to the study of
international politics and the survival of humankind, raise two subquestions.
First, under what conditions are states able to establish some form of
cooperation? International institutions, which are sets of rules that may or may
not involve international organizations, have received most attention in this
regard.1 Second, can international institutions contribute to successful interna-
tional collaboration, in some specific meaning of success, and if so, under what
conditions? The second question is even more important than the first because
it draws our attention to the form and quality of cooperation and to the
possibilities of achieving welfare-increasing cooperation in the absence of
supranational governance structures. Institutions are choice variables. If the
degree of success in international collaboration can be influenced by the
institutions we establish and operate, we can be more successful if we know
how to design institutions that produce the desired effect.
The first subquestion has been treated extensively in the international
Earlier versions of this article were written during a stay at the Center for International Affairs,
Harvard University, whose support I gratefully acknowledge. The research was supported by a
grant from the Swiss National Fund for Scientific Research (grant 8220-30628). I thank the
following persons for their advice and comments on various drafts: William Clark, Robert
Friedheim, Philipp Hildebrand, Robert Keohane, Marc Levy, Martin List, Lisa Martin, Ronald
Mitchell, John Odell, Dieter Ruloff, Detlef Sprinz, Arild Underdal, Michael Ziirn, and the
anonymous referees of International Organization. I also benefited from presentations of the paper
in the International Institutions Seminar of Harvard's Center for International Affairs; the 1994
annual meeting of the International Studies Association in Washington, D.C.; and a round-table
discussion at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.
1. See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1983); and Robert O. Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist
Challenge After the Cold War," working paper 92-7, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.,
Center for International Affairs, 1992.
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352 International Organization
relations literature.2 Research on the second subquestion is still in its infancy,
not least because it involves daunting evaluative and analytical problems.3
Every analyst who has tried knows that it is difficult to conceptualize and
measure institutions as explanatory variables; do the same for the effect of
institutions on behavior, the environment, or some other outcome; evaluate
and measure the success or failure of institutions in some reliable and
meaningful way; and develop and test theories to distinguish when and why
different types of institutions are more successful.
This article claims that positive theorizing, based on rigorous empirical
research, is still the most fruitful way of advancing our knowledge about the
effect of institutions in international politics. It outlines a rational-choice-based
research strategy that may serve as a starting point for future research. The
focus is on international environmental institutions. Such institutions are here
defined as sets of international regulations and organizations that were
intentionally established by preexisting actors (states) through explicit, legally
or politically binding, international agreements in order to regulate anthropo-
genic sources of negative externalities affecting the natural environment.4
However, many of the arguments are also relevant to the analysis of institutions
in other areas of international relations.
2. See, for example, Kenneth A. Oye, ed., Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1986); Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and
Choice in International Relations (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990); and Oran R.
Young, "The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the
Environment," International Organization 43 (Summer 1989), pp. 349-75.
3. Among the most important studies are Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A.
Levy, eds., Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993); Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International
Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel,
eds., Governance Without Government: Change and Order in World Politics (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), pp. 160-94; J0rgen Wettestad and Steinar Andresen, The Effectiveness of
International Resource Cooperation: Some Preliminary Findings (Lysaker, Norway: The Fridtjof
Nansen Institute, 1991); Arild Underdal, "The Concept of Regime 'Effectiveness,' " Cooperation
and Conflict 27 (September 1992), pp. 227-40; Marc A. Levy, "The Effectiveness of International
Environmental Institutions: What We Think We Know, and How We Might Learn More," paper
presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico,
23-27 March 1993); Marc Levy, Gail Osherenko, and Oran R. Young, The Effectiveness of
International Regimes: A Design for Large-Scale Collaborative Research (Hanover, N.H.: Dartmouth
College, Institute for Arctic Studies, 4 December 1991); and J0rgen Wettestad, Institutional Design
and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes: A Conceptual Framework (Lysaker,
Norway: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1994).
4. Somewhat broader definitions can be found in Martin List and Volker Rittberger, "Regime
Theory and International Environmental Management," in Andrew Hurrell and Benedict
Kingsbury, eds., The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp.
85-109; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, p. 2. Note that the more narrow definition
in this article controls for the peculiar (and poorly understood) effects that unintentionally
established or informal institutions (often called social conventions) may have. For analyses of
informal social institutions, see Jack Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1992); and Friedrich Kratochwil, "Contract and Regimes: Do Issue-
Specificity and Variations of Formality Matter," in Volker Rittberger and Peter Mayer, eds.,
Regime Theory and International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 73-93.
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Environmental institutions 353
International environmental cooperation has increased dramatically in the
past two decades. Governments and their agents have responded to the
growing array of national and transboundary ecological problems by negotiat-
ing, concluding, and modifying international treaties and other types of
agreements and by establishing and reforming international organizations.5
International agreements are now in place for atmospheric ozone depletion,
climate change, whaling, fisheries, marine pollution, river and lake manage-
ment, transboundary air pollution, endangered species, trade in toxic waste,
nuclear safety, deforestation, and many other issues.6
Like students of domestic politics, analysts of international relations know by
intuition or practical experience that environmental institutions vary enor-
mously in terms of their performance. Some institutions are little more than
green window-dressing, whereas others achieve more than their creators had
hoped for. To arrive at practical recommendations for the design and operation
of institutions, however, we have to move beyond this conventional wisdom. We
have to assess and compare institutional performance systematically and
explain when and why specific types of institutions influence the behavior of
governments, businesses, and other actors in a direction that solves the
environmental problems that motivated their establishment.
The question about the effect of institutions is also at the center of a broader
debate in international relations theory. The study of institutions has made an
important comeback since the 1970s. It has contributed significantly to the
international cooperation literature by explaining when and why international
institutions emerge or change.7 The advocates of this research program claim
that institutions can facilitate the resolution of coordination and collaboration
problems in international politics if they are properly designed and operated.8
5. Haas, Keohane, and Levy estimate that more than half of the 140 multilateral environmental
treaties adopted since 1921 were concluded after the 1972 United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment. See their Institutions for the Earth, p. 6.
6. See, for example, Lynton Keith Caldwell, International Environmental Policy: Emergence and
Dimensions, 2d ed. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990); Andrew Hurrell and Benedict
Kingsbury, eds., The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); The
Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Green Globe Yearbook 1993 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993);
Jessica Tuchman Mathews, ed., Preserving the Global Environment: The Challenge of Shared
Leadership (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991); John E. Carroll, ed., International Environmental
Diplomacy: The Management and Resolution of Transfrontier Environmental Problems (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Dimitris Stevis, Valerie J. Assetto, and Stephen P.
Mumme, "International Environmental Politics: A Theoretical Review of the Literature," in
James P. Lester, ed., Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1989), pp. 289-313.
7. See, for example, Oran R. Young, International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural
Resources and the Environment (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989); Friedrich Kratochwil
and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,"
International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-75; Krasner, International Regimes; Robert
O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); and Rittberger and Mayer, Regime Theory and International
Relations.
8. Robert Keohane, Michael McGinnis, and Elinor Ostrom, eds., Proceedings of a Conference on
Linking Local and Global Commons, Held at Harvard University, April 23-25, 1992 (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University, The Center for International Affairs, 1993); and Haas, Keohane, and
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354 International Organization
Thus they imply that policymakers and other actors in the international arena
have some room for maneuver, delimited by power structures, national
interests, and other nonchoice variables, for designing and operating institu-
tions that increase the welfare of their participants.
The most basic assumption of this argument, that institutions can have an
independent impact on behavior and other outcomes, has been persistently
challenged by competing explanations of outcomes in international relations
and particularly by neorealism.9 Proponents of realism argue that the design
and effect of institutions simply reflect the existing distribution of power and
national interests, and that collaboration falters quickly when these conditions
change; powerful actors simply ignore or change international rules whenever
they dislike them. Any correlations between institutions and outcomes that we
may observe are spurious because both variables are driven by power and
interests.
Empirical research, guided by a coherent theory and basic social science
methodology, is the most productive way to assess these competing claims and
arrive at insights that are of practical value to policymakers. Considerable
amounts of data have been gathered on the design and operation of interna-
tional environmental institutions, not least because of heightened concern
about the environment around the time of the 1992 Earth Summit. These data
and their as yet cursory analysis suggest that institutions may have an
independent effect on progress in environmental protection under some
circumstances.10 But, as the following section argues, the existing literature on
the subject is quite weak from theoretical and methodological standpoints.
The subsequent section outlines a research strategy for measuring and
explaining the effect of international environmental institutions more systemati-
cally. It submits that we can measure the outcomes to be explained in terms of
goal attainment; that is, the difference over time or across cases between actor
behavior—or the state of the natural environment—along dimensions identi-
fied by institutional goals and end points defined by institutional goals. We can
Levy, Institutions for the Earth. For a critical review of claims that institutions can facilitate progress
in international politics, see Giulio M. Gallarotti, "The Limits of International Organization:
Systematic Failure in the Management of International Relations," International Organization 45
(Spring 1991), pp. 183-220.
9. See Stephen D. Krasnsr, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, pp. 1-21; Emerson M. S. Niou and Peter
C. Ordeshook, "Less Filling, Tastes Great: The Realist-Neoliberal Debate," World Politics 46
(January 1994), pp. 209-34; Robert Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory: The
Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization 48 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-44; Stephen
D. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," World
Politics 43 (April 1991), pp. 336-66; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International
Politics," International Security 18 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; and David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and
Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
10. See, for example, The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Green Globe Yearbook 1993; Peter H. Sand,
"Innovations in International Environmental Governance," Environment 32 (November 1990), pp.
16-44; and Peter H. Sand, ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey
of Existing Legal Instruments (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1992).
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Environmental institutions 355
assess the effect of an institution in terms of the extent to which it contributes,
ceteris paribus, to variation in goal attainment. We use these two variables to
produce a score of institutional effectiveness. This score indicates the extent to
which an institution has contributed to the resolution of the environmental
problem that led to its establishment. Finally, we examine the implications of
variation in institutional design for the effectiveness of institutions. Decision-
making rules, membership and access conditions, and the compliance system of
institutions are among the most important design dimensions.
The research strategy proposed in this article provides a starting point for
more rigorous and comparable case studies. Such studies are necessary to fine
tune the research strategy and generate new hypotheses about the impact of
variation in institutional design. The research strategy outlined here also can
serve as a starting point for larger scale comparative work. Without such work,
we cannot arrive at comparable assessments and generalizable explanations of
the effect and effectiveness of international institutions.
Weaknesses of current research
Current research on the effect of international environmental institutions
suffers from two types of weaknesses. The first is confusion about the
dependent variable. Broadly conceived, this variable expresses the extent to
which institutions contribute to resolving international environmental prob-
lems. Second, most authors define their explanatory variables, particularly
international institutions, vaguely. In addition, analysts have focused predomi-
nantly on whether the existence or operation of institutions per se has an effect
on progress in environmental problem solving. They have not produced
generalizable answers as to what types of institutions are more successful than
others under specific conditions; that is, which dimensions of institutional
design are crucial to institutional success or failure.
The dependent variable
The concept of institutional effect raises three questions. Which outcomes
do institutions affect and which of these outcomes should analysts focus on?
How can these outcomes be evaluated in terms of institutional success or
failure? Which measurement operations are required to assess the effect of an
institution?
In principle, international environmental institutions can be said to have an
effect if they influence any type of outcome. We may argue that international
regulations on atmospheric ozone depletion have an effect if a single firm
reduces its production of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), substances that contrib-
ute to the destruction of the ozone layer. The same regulations may also
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356 International Organization
decrease, say, a government's incentive to promote the domestic production of
CFCs.11 In the first case, the outcome to explain is the behavior of firms. In the
second case, it is the interests or behavior of governments. The list of possible
outcomes is long. Michael Ziirn, for example, distinguishes among fifteen
groups of variables that institutions may affect. This typology is defined by level
of analysis (government, society/domestic politics, issue area) and the behav-
ior, capabilities, cognition, values and interests, and constitution of the units at
the different levels of analysis.12
Because the chances of finding significant causal relationships decline
rapidly with the number of dependent variables, any research design will have
to focus on a single or very few outcomes that can be measured reliably and that
are valid in the sense of capturing the "true" meaning of institutional effect.
But analysts disagree about which outcomes are relevant from a theoretical or
normative perspective and which outcomes can be analyzed from a methodologi-
cal standpoint (e.g., is there enough variance to explain, are sufficient data
available in accessible form, can outcomes be aggregated). To make matters
worse, most studies define their dependent variable(s) vaguely. As a result,
they operate with ill-defined analytical frameworks, which produces results
that do not systematically flow from the empirical data and are rarely
comparable.
The authors of Institutions for the Earth, one of the most influential studies on
the effect of international environmental institutions, refer almost interchange-
ably to institutional effect, impact, effectiveness, institutional roles or func-
tions, success or failure, and compliance, as well as to actor behavior and the
state of the natural environment as the outcome to be explained. At other
points, they argue that they explain the impact of institutions on environmental
concern, on the international contractual environment, and on domestic
capacity for environmental protection at three stages in the environmental
protection process: agenda setting, bargaining and contracting, and implemen-
tation.13 The place of these variables, or rather concepts, in the analytical
framework of the project remains unclear. They appear both as explanations
for the success or failure of environmental protection and as dependent
variables that are influenced by institutions and exogenous variables such as
power and interests. Hence, it seems that they are regarded both as causes and
consequences of international institutions. In addition, the relationships
among these concepts and behavioral and environmental outcomes remain
largely hypothetical.
11. For an analysis of the stratospheric ozone case, see Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy:
New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).
12. Michael Ziirn, "Consequences of Regime Definitions and Definitions of Regime Conse-
quences: Proposals for a Data Bank on International Regimes," working paper, presented at a
meeting entitled "Regimes Summit," Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth College, Hanover,
New Hampshire, October 1991.
13. Haas, Keohane, and Levy, Institutions for the Earth, pp. 3-24 and 397-426.
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Environmental institutions 357
Harold Jacobson and David Kay, in one of the pioneering studies on the
effect of international environmental organizations, use multiple indicators: for
example, participant and observer attitudes toward accomplished results,
procedural and substantial goal attainment, and the impact of a program on the
environment.14 A research design with so many dependent variables, which are
difficult to aggregate, and that compares only eleven cases does not permit
generalizable causal claims about the effect of international environmental
organizations. In a study on international trade in textiles, Vinod Aggarwal
explains regime strength, defined as the "stringency with which rules regulate
the behavior of countries."15 The validity of this variable is based on the
assumption that more concrete and binding regulations are more likely to have
an impact on actor behavior. This assumption blurs the distinction of
institutions as explanatory and actor behavior as dependent variables and
renders the analysis of institutional effect very difficult. Elinor Ostrom, who
examines the management of common pool resources at the domestic level,
explains a mixture of regulatory output and implementation of regulations. She
defines the failure of institutions as not being able to put a regime in place or
having a set of rules that are not enforced.16 This definition lumps together the
explanation of cooperation as such and the explanation of institutional
performance. On a more abstract level, authors such as Marc Levy and Arild
Underdal seem to disagree over whether social scientists should explain
behavior or changes in the natural environment.17
The next point to clarify concerns evaluative criteria. Such criteria are
required to measure and compare the extent and direction of an institutional
effect on a given outcome. We are interested in whether, and to what degree,
institutions drive outcomes in a "good" or "bad" direction. For example, Levy
notes that because the International Whaling Commission established global
but not national quotas, it generated a whaling Olympic. National fishing
industries acquired large fishing fleets that were economically efficient only if
they killed whales at an ecologically unsustainable rate.18 In this case, the
14. Harold K. Jacobson and David A. Kay, eds., Environmental Protection: The International
Dimension (Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld/Osmun, 1983).
15. Vinod K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 20. Similar concepts can be found in Mark V.
Zacker, "Trade Gaps, Analytical Gaps: Regime Analysis and International Commodity Trade
Regulation," International Organization 41 (Spring 1987), p. 117; and Abram Chayes and Antonia
Handler Chayes, "Compliance Without Enforcement: State Behavior Under Regulatory Treaties,"
Negotiation Journal (July 1991), pp. 311-30.
16. Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 55-56.
17. See Levy, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions; and Underdal, "The
Concept of Regime 'Effectiveness.' "
18. Levy, The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions, p. 4. On the whaling case,
see M. J. Peterson, "Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International Management
of Whaling," International Organization 46 (Winter 1992), pp. 147-86; and Halldor Asgrimsson,
"Developments Leading to the 1982 Decision of the International Whaling Commission for a Zero
Catch Quota 1986-90," in Steinar Andresen and Willy 0streng, International Resource Manage-
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358 International Organization
whaling institution would be successful to the degree that it succeeds in keeping
whale stocks at a sustainable level.
Besides disagreeing over the outcomes to be explained, analysts also disagree
about the standards against which these outcomes should be evaluated.
Successful institutions, in a very comprehensive sense of success, are those that
(1) change the behavior of states and other actors in the direction intended by
the cooperating parties, (2) solve the environmental problems they are
supposed to solve, and (3) do so in an efficient and equitable manner.19 No
study has tried to evaluate outcomes, however defined, against all three
criteria, and any effort to do so is bound to fail due to the extreme complexity of
the task. Even the evaluation against more narrowly defined standards poses
great difficulties.
Elsewhere, I have tried to assess the efficiency of regulations concerning
pollution of the river Rhine.20 I argue that the high transaction costs of
negotiating and implementing chloride reductions along the Rhine through
international financing of such reductions at a potash mine in France have all
but eliminated the efficiency gains of this approach as compared with
alternative approaches. The evaluation of efficiency involves assessing the costs
and benefits of establishing and operating an environmental institution and
then comparing these costs and benefits to those of alternative behavioral
options. The standard for efficiency is usually the Pareto frontier. At this point,
no actor can achieve a greater benefit without making at least one other actor
worse off. Efficiency tends to be a more attractive concept for abstract
reasoning than for empirical research.21 Costs and benefits in environmental
politics, which determine the utility functions of the actors, are often nonmon-
etary and difficult to measure unless we take the problematic step of inferring
ex ante preferences from observed behavior.22 In addition, as Underdal notes,
the Pareto frontier is very sensitive to changes in the set of actors, preferences,
and issues.23 Comparing efficiency across cases and time is thus very difficult,
and most efficiency assessments, such as in the Rhine case, remain extremely
crude.
Ziirn examines the conditions under which institutions that are just emerge.24
ment: The Role of Science and Politics (London: Belhaven Press, 1989), pp. 221-31. Negative effects
of international institutions are discussed by Gallarotti, "The Limits of International Organiza-
tion."
19. For a discussion of various evaluative standards, see Young, "The Effectiveness of
International Institutions"; and Underdal, "The Concept of Regime 'Effectiveness.' "
20. Thomas Bernauer, "International Financing of Environmental Protection: Lessons from
Efforts to Protect the River Rhine Against Chloride Pollution," Environmental Politics, forthcom-
ing.
21. For an abstract comparison of five global regimes for greenhouse gas reductions against
economic efficiency criteria, see Joshua M. Epstein and Raj Gupta, Controlling the Greenhouse
Effect: Five Global Regimes Compared (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990).
22. Frances Cairncross, Costing the Earth (London: Economist Books, 1991).
23. Underdal, "The Concept of Regime 'Effectiveness,' " pp. 230-34.
24. Michael Ziirn, Gerechte Internationale Regime: Bedingungen und Restriktionen der
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Environmental institutions 359
The assessment of justice, which in this case is closely related to equity, involves
the evaluation of the distribution of costs and benefits that flow from
international interaction and a comparison of this distribution against some
normatively preferred distribution. This evaluative criterion is even more
problematic than the efficiency standard. Besides the problem of measuring
costs and benefits, any assessment of equity or justice has to be based on a
theory of fairness; and virtually all theories of equity or fairness are controver-
sial.25
Several authors have proposed simpler evaluative criteria. Many of them, for
example Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Ronald Mitchell,
examine compliance. Compliance may be defined as the degree to which actor
behavior conforms to the injunctions set by the rules of an institution.26 The use
of this criterion creates an endogeneity problem: the evaluative standard that is
used in the measurement of the dependent variable (behavior is assessed
against rules) is also part of the explanatory concept (institutions include the
same rules). This problem renders causal inference regarding the effect of
institutions on outcomes very difficult. With few exceptions, such as Mitchell's
study on oil pollution, compliance with institutional rules rarely has been
traced back to institutions in a systematic manner.27 In addition, compliance
may not tell us much about the success of an institution in solving the
environmental problem that motivated its establishment. International rules
can be designed so that even the worst polluters easily comply without having to
change their behavior significantly.
J0rgen Wettestad and Steinar Andresen propose three evaluative criteria,
two of which avoid the pitfalls of the compliance concept: the degree to which
the parties have reached the institutional goals; the degree to which expert
advice and actual decisions correlate; and the degree to which the state of the
environment has improved as compared with what would have happened in the
absence of the institution.28 The first criterion is broader than compliance but
also creates the same endogeneity problem. The second criterion reflects an
Entstehung nicht-hegemonialer internationaler Regime untersucht am Beispiel der Weltkommu-
nikationsordnung (Just international regimes: Conditions and restrictions for the emergence of
nonhegemonic international regimes, analyzed on the basis of the world communication order)
(Frankfurt a.M: Haag und Herchen, 1987).
25. For a rational-choice-based analysis of equity and fairness issues, see Peyton H. Young,
Equity in Theory and Practice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
26. See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance," International Organiza-
tion 47 (Spring 1993), pp. 175-205; Ronald B. Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea:
Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994); and Oran R.
Young, Compliance and Public Authority: A Theory with International Applications (Baltimore, Md.:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979); and Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of
International Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517 and p. 496 in
particular.
27. Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea.
28. Wettestad and Andresen, The Effectiveness of International Resource Cooperation.
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360 International Organization
attempt to control for whether institutional goals are conducive to environmen-
tal protection. Hence it is more valid than compliance in terms of capturing the
"true" meaning of institutional success. Its principal problem is that scientists
often disagree or their advice may be wrong. The third criterion evaluates
relative progress in environmental protection against the baseline of a world
without the institution. This criterion includes a counterfactual component
that introduces an element of more or less informed speculation into the
measurement of the dependent variable.
Marc Levy, Gail Osherenko, and Oran Young focus on the behavior of
members of an institution in accordance with the broader objectives the
institution was established to achieve.29 This concept is attractive from the
validity viewpoint because it relates to problem solving. The endogeneity
problem is smaller because broad institutional goals are usually not as closely
related to institutional design and operation as specific rules or more narrowly
defined goals. In addition, this criterion does not require the agreement of
scientists or counterfactual assessment. The institution regulating chloride
pollution of the Rhine can, for example, be evaluated in terms of the evolution
of chloride concentrations with regard to the goal of eliminating the damage
that chloride pollution inflicts on Dutch farmers and waterworks.
Two problems, however, with the criterion of problem solving remain. First,
it is difficult to weigh the observed outcome against the environmental problem
and to compare this assessment across cases. Large changes of behavior in the
desired direction for the area of stratospheric ozone depletion may constitute
a much smaller success than small changes of behavior on a much bigger
problem, such as global warming.30 Second, if an institution has more than one
goal, we face problems of aggregation. In the case of international regulations
on whaling before 1982, it will be difficult to aggregate the welfare of the
whaling industry with some notion of sustainable whale stocks. The interna-
tional institution overseeing chemical pollution of the Rhine has had more
success in establishing an early warning system for accidental spills than in
actually cleaning up the Rhine.
The third problem in defining and measuring the dependent variable stems
from the causal element inherent in the concept of institutional effect. Most
studies ignore this causal element. They assess changes of behavior, the natural
environment, or other outcomes in the issue-area covered by an institution. If
change is observed, it is attributed to the institution, based on some sketchy
theoretical or empirical argument. Charlotte Ku, for example, argues that the
law of the sea convention has had the effect of spurring the settlement of
boundary disputes. She notes that of the more than 130 ocean boundaries that
were regarded as settled in 1989, 60-65 percent were settled after it became
29. Levy, Osherenko, and Young, The Effectiveness of International Regimes.
30. Underdal, "The Concept of Regime 'Effectiveness,' " p. 229.
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Environmental institutions 361
evident that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea would
formally recognize multiple bands of coastal state jurisdiction.31
Such assessments of institutional effect are deficient because they do not
control the impact of exogenous variables on the observed correlation between
institutions and outcomes. The increase in the settlement of boundary disputes
in the law of the sea case might, for example, have been caused by the general
growth in maritime traffic or other uses of the sea, irrespective of the
international regulatory effort. Conversely, we may misinterpret as a failure a
case where marine pollution did not improve following the creation of a new
institution because a noninstitutional factor neutralized the positive effect of
the institution. An increased pollution input from a nonregulated source, such
as a tributary river, may have such an effect.
Some authors try to control exogenous variables but fail to do so rigorously
because they do not distinguish between institutional and noninstitutional
variables clearly enough. Peter Haas, in his study of institutions to protect
regional seas, employs exogenous explanatory factors that are largely identical
to the United Nations Environment Program's institutional objectives.32
Wettestad and Andresen distinguish two types of explanatory variables:
problem solving and capacity of a regime. It seems, however, that both
categories include institutional as well as power- and interest-related vari-
ables.33
The theoretical value of studies that do not sufficiently control exogenous
variables is small because they ignore critics who argue that institutions are
merely frozen interests and power structures and do not have an independent
effect on outcomes in international affairs. These critics claim that when we
observe that states behave in accordance with institutional rules or goals, these
states do not comply because the designers of the institution made smart
choices. They comply because powerful states threaten potential violators with
economic sanctions or because compliance is so beneficial that states would
comply irrespective of what other actors do.
Institutional design
Analysts have focused on whether the existence or operation of institutions
per se has an effect on particular outcomes rather than on specific institutional
features that may account for variation in institutional effect. Projects led by
Haas, Keohane, and Levy, and by Levy, Osherenko, and Young, for example,
are based on the inductive analysis of the functions through which institutions
31. Charlotte Ku, "Ocean Boundaries: Does the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention Matter?"
paper prepared for the annual convention of the International Studies Association in Acapulco,
Mexico, 23-27 March 1993.
32. Peter M. Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental
Cooperation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
33. Wettestad and Andresen, The Effectiveness of International Resource Cooperation.
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362 International Organization
may contribute to progress in environmental protection. The suggested
functions are roughly compatible with the behavioral models that can be found
in the sociologically oriented and rational-choice literature.34
This approach tells us how institutions may influence outcomes by shaping
behavior in a variety of ways. It also makes an attempt to control the influence
of noninstitutional variables. But it does not explain in a generalizable way the
degree of institutional success or failure in terms of variation in the features of
institutions. Not surprisingly, therefore, the advice that policymakers may
derive from these studies remains vague or idiosyncratic. It consists of
information on how policymakers have, in the cases examined, dealt with
environmental problems through international institutions and how these
institutions have contributed, each one in its peculiar way, to success or failure
in environmental management.35 It is up to individual policymakers to evaluate
whether the insights from a given case are applicable to other cases.
There is no shortage of suggestions as to which dimensions of institutional
design are potentially relevant to the performance of international environmen-
tal institutions. (I henceforth use the term "institutional design" in a sense that
includes constitutional design variables and operational factors.) Young
highlights transparency procedures, collective choice mechanisms, and transfor-
mation rules.36 The Chayeses and Mitchell stress the importance of monitor-
ing.37 Peter Sand argues that the following institutional design features make
international environmental protection more effective: interim operation of
environmental treaties before entry into force; utilization of soft law; regula-
tions applied to the regional rather than global level; differential instead of
universally applicable obligations; delegation of decision-making authority to
specialized organs; regular reviews of the operation of treaties; and selective
incentives.38 Andresen and Wettestad emphasize the number of actors and the
34. For examples of the former, see James N. Rosenau, "Before Cooperation: Hegemons,
Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics," International Organization 40 (Autumn
1986), pp. 849-94; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "The Force of Prescriptions," International Organiza-
tion 38 (Autumn 1984), pp. 685-708; Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the
Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make
of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics," International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp.
391^25; and Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, "Institutions and International Order," in
Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges:
Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-73.
For examples of the latter, see Knight, Institutions and Social Conflict; Beth V. Yarbrough and
Robert M. Yarbrough, "International Institutions and the New Economics of Organization,"
International Organization 44 (Spring 1990), pp. 235-59; Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic
Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (New York: Free Press, 1985);
Robert O. Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," in Krasner, International Regimes,
pp. 141-71; and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation andDiscordin the World Political
Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
35. See in particular Haas, Keohane, and Levy, Institutions for the Earth, pp. 408-15.
36. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Institutions."
37. See Chayes and Chayes, "On Compliance"; and Mitchell, Intentional Oil Pollution at Sea.
38. See Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance (Washington, D.C.:
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Environmental institutions 363
scope of the institutional agenda.39 Wettestad stresses the importance of
participatory scope and access to an institution, decision-making rules, the role
of secretariats, the scope of the institutional agenda, the organization of
scientific or technical input, and verification and compliance mechanisms.40
Most of these propositions are not embedded in a coherent theoretical
argument. They are ad hoc hypotheses derived from intuition, inductive
studies, a large spectrum of social science theories, and practical knowledge on
the conduct of international environmental politics. Further, they have not
been systematically tested and compared in terms of their relative explanatory
weight.
The most rigorous research on the implications of variation in institutional
design has been carried out by students of institutions at the domestic level. It
has examined general design principles that underlie successful, self-organized
institutions for the management of common pool resources, such as fisheries,
communal forests and grazing areas, groundwater basins, oil fields, or irrigation
systems.41 Michael McGinnis and Elinor Ostrom, for example, argue that the
following design principles make local common pool resource institutions more
successful and project these insights to the international level: clearly defined
boundaries of a resource and the right to use the resource; congruence among
rules and local conditions; involvement of individuals affected by the rules in
rule modification; monitoring by the users of the resource or by agents
accountable to the users; the same for sanctions, which should be graduated;
access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms; a certain autonomy of local
institutions from higher authorities; and the organization of institutions in
nested layers.42
The extent to which these propositions are relevant to environmental
institutions at the international level is largely an open question. Some
propositions might be irrelevant. Haas, Keohane, and Levy, the Chayeses, and
World Resources Institute, 1990); and Peter H. Sand, "Innovations in International Environmen-
tal Governance."
39. Wettestad and Andresen, The Effectiveness of International Resource Cooperation.
40. See also Wettestad, Institutional Design and the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Regimes. For an analysis of the science and politics interface in international environmental affairs,
see Andresen and 0streng, International Resource Management; Tora Skodvin and Arild Underdal,
"The Science-Politics Interface: Transforming Knowledge into Decision Inputs for International
Environmental Regimes," paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies
Association, Washington, D.C., 29 March-1 April 1994; and Michael E. Kowalok, "Research
Lessons from Acid Rain, Ozone Depletion, and Global Warming," Environment 35 (July/August
1993), pp. 12-38.
41. Keohane, McGinnis, and Ostrom, Proceedings of a Conference on Linking Local and Global
Commons; and Ostrom, Governing the Commons. Another area of research on institutions at the
domestic level deals with legislatures. See, for example, Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R.
Weingast, "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review
81 (March 1987), pp. 85-104.
42. See Michael McGinnis and Elinor Ostrom, "Design Principles for Local and Global
Commons," in Keohane, McGinnis, and Ostrom, Proceedings of a Conference on Linking Local and
Global Commons, pp. 16-65; and Ostrom, Governing the Commons, p. 90.
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364 International Organization
others claim that sanctions play only a minor role in affecting the behavior of
actors in international environmental politics.43 The proposition concerning
the autonomy of local institutions from higher authorities is rarely applicable in
international affairs. With the exception of the European Union (EU), there is
no higher authority. In addition, the explanatory value of these propositions for
domestic-level institutions remains contested. Michael Taylor, for example,
notes that they are not linked to a coherent explanatory theory and are based
on a very informal analytical framework. He also argues that the proposed
design principles appear to be features or results rather than causes of
successful resolution of common pool resource problems.44
How we might learn more
The remainder of this article outlines a research strategy in three steps to
evaluate the effect of institutions per se and to explain variation in the
effectiveness of institutions in terms of their design. First, the outcome to be
explained is measured in terms of goal attainment. Goal attainment is defined
as the difference, over time or across cases, between actor behavior or the state
of the natural environment along dimensions identified by institutional goals,
on the one hand, and certain endpoints defined by institutional goals, on the
other. Second, the effect of an institution is measured in terms of the extent to
which the existence or operation of the institution contributes, ceteris paribus,
to variation in goal attainment. These two variables are transformed into a
score of institutional effectiveness. This score indicates the degree to which an
institution has contributed to the resolution of the environmental problem that
motivated its establishment. Third, the effect of variation along specific
dimensions of institutional design (such as decision-making rules, membership
and access conditions, and the compliance system) is analyzed.
The basic assumptions underlying the proposed research strategy are those
of rational-choice theory. I assume states to be unitary and boundedly rational
actors. Cooperation between these actors is often difficult because the costs
and benefits of behavioral options as well as the preferences and behavior of
other actors are uncertain, the actors are opportunistic, and enforcement is
imperfect and costly. Under these circumstances, international institutions
facilitate cooperation by signaling the parties' commitment to an ongoing
relationship, hence lengthening the shadow of the future. They generate
information, thus increasing transparency, reducing uncertainty, and facilitat-
43. See Haas, Keohane, and Levy, Institutions for the Earth; and Chayes and Chayes,
"Compliance Without Enforcement."
44. Michael Taylor, "The Economics and Politics of Property Rights and Common Pool
Resources," Natural Resources Journal 32 (Summer 1992), p. 640 in particular.
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Environmental institutions 365
ing strategies of reciprocity. They help to mediate disputes and provide
procedures for aggregating individual choices at lower (transaction) cost.45
Some versions of this argument claim that institutions are efficient solutions
to collective action problems. Institutions exist because they are instrumental
in maximizing states' utility. If they do not perform well, they will disappear. In
this Darwinist view of institutions, the study of institutional effect is uninterest-
ing. There will be little variation in the performance of existing institutions,
which are those that have survived the selection process because they are
efficient.
To escape this tautological argument, Jon Elster has demanded a stringent
assessment of functional theories. Analysts must show that an institution serves
an unintended and unrecognized function for a group of actors and that this
function feeds back to maintain or reproduce the institution.46 Herbert Simon
has suggested a less demanding requirement. He states that "Institutions are
functional if reasonable men might create and maintain them in order to meet
social needs or achieve social goals."47 This argument does not require
demonstration of unintended or unrecognized functions. Nor does it imply that
only efficient institutions survive. It allows for variation in the performance of
existing institutions.
Analysts have used two research strategies to demonstrate that institutions,
through the functions they perform, are responsible for some variation in
collective outcomes. The first strategy, exemplified by Haas, Keohane, and
Levy, and by Levy, Osherenko, and Young, constructs detailed narrative
accounts that trace causal pathways from institutions to outcomes.48 It seeks to
demonstrate that institutions affect collective outcomes by performing the
functions proposed by rational-choice theory or some other behavioral model.
The second approach, used by McGinnis and Ostrom, and by Wettestad and
Andresen, develops hypotheses that link explanatory variables to collective
outcomes.49 It then identifies and measures variation in the existence and
operation of institutions, specific dimensions of institutional design, collective
outcomes, and institutional performance and examines whether these variables
correlate over time or across cases. Controlling exogenous variables, advancing
theoretical arguments about the relevance of explanatory variables to the
45. See Yarbrough and Yarbrough, "International Institutions and the New Economics of
Organization"; and Andrew Kydd and Duncan Snidal, "Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of
International Regimes," in Rittberger and Mayer, Regime Theory and International Relations, pp.
112-35.
46. Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
47. Herbert Simon, "Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought," American Economic
Review Papers and Proceedings 68 (May 1978), p. 3.
48. See Haas, Keohane, and Levy, Institutions for the Earth; and Levy, Osherenko, and Young,
The Effectiveness of International Regimes.
49. See McGinnis and Ostrom, "Design Principles for Local and Global Commons"; Wettestad
and Andresen, The Effectiveness of International Resource Cooperation; and Wettestad, Institutional
Design and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes.
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366 International Organization
performance of institutional functions, and the (usually sketchy) empirical
tracing of causal pathways bolster claims that correlations reflect causal
relationships.
The research strategy proposed below reflects the second approach. This
approach is preferable because it facilitates comparative research, which is
indispensable for arriving at more generalizable propositions about necessary
or sufficient conditions for the effect or effectiveness of institutions. As noted
earlier, the first approach alone cannot generate such knowledge. I will argue,
however, that the first research strategy can support the second.
Measuring outcomes
Outcomes to be explained should, first, be closely related to problem solving
and second, reliably measured. As Yarbrough and Yarbrough note, problem
solving is the dominant idea in rational-choice-based institutionalism, which
emphasizes the purposive, intentional, and instrumental character of social
institutions.50 We are ultimately concerned more about cleaner rivers, sustain-
able fisheries, or lower greenhouse gas emissions and less about political
popularity functions or treaty ratifications. Outcomes associated more indi-
rectly with institutions may, nonetheless, be important. Institutions can have a
positive spillover effect on cooperative efforts in other issue-areas, or they may
have a general effect on confidence and conflict resolution (as in the case of
some East-West environmental institutions—for example, the one for the
Barents Sea).51 But such outcomes are harder to trace back to institutions
because causal chains are likely to be longer. In addition, the more outcomes
we seek to explain, the greater the problems of aggregating those outcomes—
and aggregation will be necessary to arrive at significant causal claims.
A straightforward way of selecting the outcome to explain is to identify the
principal goals of an institution and to define those goals as dimensions over
which behavioral or environmental outcomes vary. Such goals should be
defined in terms of environmental problems that the institution is supposed to
solve. This type of outcome is relatively easy to measure; it is closely related to
problem solving; and it facilitates the analysis because an institution is more
likely to have an observable and explainable effect in the area(s) it explicitly
targets.
The principal goal of the institution to protect the stratospheric ozone layer
is to reduce anthropogenic emissions of ozone depleting chemicals, such as
CFCs. To achieve this goal, the institution aims at reducing the production of
such chemicals. The dimension of variation is the production of ozone
depleting chemicals. The outcome to be explained is variation in the produc-
50. Yarbrough and Yarbrough, "International Institutions and the New Economic of Organiza-
tion," p. 253.
51. Geir Ulfstein, "The Barents Sea After the Cold War," paper presented at the annual
meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., 28 March-1 April 1994.
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tion of specific ozone depleting chemicals, or the entire class of such chemicals,
over time, across countries, or other units of analysis.52 In measuring these
outcomes, we need to be sensitive to the possibility that institutional goals
change over time. The goal of the international whaling institution, for
example, changed in 1982 from sustainable management of whales to the
protection of whales (zero catches).
The identification and measurement of outcomes, as defined above, poses
the following problems. First, dimensions of variation may be difficult to
identify because the goals of an institution are ambiguous. This problem can
only be resolved through careful study of treaty texts and other documents,
interviews, and possibly disaggregation of ambiguous goals into several
dimensions of variation.
Second, international environmental institutions can have more than one
goal. In this case, the analyst may select the goal that is considered the most
important according to environmental criteria or the perceptions of policymak-
ers. Standardized interviews with experts or policymakers might support such a
selection. Alternatively, the analyst can select several or all of the goals and
aggregate the resulting variables into one or more dependent variables. If goals
are contradictory, aggregation will of course be difficult. The International
Tropical Timber Agreement aims at enhancing trade in tropical timber and
improving sustainable forest management.53 Before 1982, the International
Whaling Commission sought to regulate the utilization of whale resources and
to conserve these resources. In both cases, the two goals have different end
points. In the timber case, for example, optimal sustainable forest management
is likely to be associated with a different extent of timber harvesting than the
optimal level of timber trade. In such cases, each dimension should be
measured and explained separately. The advantage of not aggregating these
outcomes may be that it produces more cases for comparison. The analyst can
investigate whether and why an institution has been more or less successful
with regard to one goal than another.
Third, institutional goals are critical for identifying the institution as an
environmental one. The boundary in this regard is often unclear. The goals of
the Senegal River-basin institution, for example, are to expand hydroelectric
power production and irrigation and to facilitate navigation through flood
control.54 They have little to do with environmental conservation in the
traditional sense and more to do with resource management. In the case of
fisheries, institutions are often regarded as environmental only when fish stocks
52. For an analysis of institutional effect in the ozone layer case, see Edward A. Parson,
"Protecting the Ozone Layer," in Haas, Keohane, and Levy, Institutions for the Earth, pp. 27-73.
53. Kenton R. Miller, Walter V. Reid, and Charles V. Barber, "Deforestation and Species
Loss," in Mathews, Preserving the Global Environment, pp. 78-111.
54. C. O. Okidi, "Environmental Stress and Conflicts in Africa: Case Studies of African
International Drainage Basins," manuscript, School of Environmental Studies, Moi University,
Eldoret, Kenya, 1992.
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crash. However, the problem here is one of explanation rather than definition
and measurement of outcomes. Should we consider environmental institutions
as a separate class of international institutions? Doing so is analytically useful
only to the extent that it facilitates the comparison of different institutions of a
given class by holding class-specific variables constant. Whether there are
class-specific variables, for example high uncertainty, that make environmental
institutions different from other institutions is an open question. Focusing on
environmental institutions is usually done for normative or pragmatic rather
than analytical reasons.55 From an analytical viewpoint, it might make more
sense to compare the Senegal River institution with the Rhine regulations on
chloride pollution rather than comparing the Rhine case with the ozone
institution. The distinction along the lines of pure versus impure public goods,
the number of actors involved, or the income of the actors might well turn out
to be more fruitful than the distinction of environmental versus nonenvironmen-
tal institutions.
The above definition of outcomes is sufficient to conduct individual case
studies. The effect of international institutions explains relative change against
specific baselines toward or away from institutional goals. But for comparative
research we need evaluative criteria that make changes in behavior or
environmental outcomes comparable across cases. If we compare outcomes in
the ozone case with outcomes in the area of international trade in toxic waste,
we may, as a fictitious example, observe a worldwide decline by 50 percent in
the production of CFCs and a 30 percent decline in illegal trade in toxic
waste.56 In which case is there more environmental progress? The answer
depends on the standards against which the outcome is assessed.
The most widely used standards are some notion of collective optimum (for
example, the Pareto frontier), compliance, and the goal(s) of an institution.
The third standard is (arguably) preferable to the other two. It is simpler to
identify than a collective optimum, which scientists may disagree about and
economists may find difficult to determine because costs and benefits are hard
to measure. It is less susceptible to the endogeneity problem of compliance that
was noted earlier. Broader goals determine the features of an institution to a
lesser extent than specific institutional rules. In addition, when states set
broader institutional goals, these goals are less likely to be lowest common
denominator solutions than concrete international rules that have to be
implemented within specific time frames. The principal weakness of this
standard, from which the collective optimum and compliance standards also
55. For an attempt to distinguish cooperation on security and economic issues, which raises
similar problems, see Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security
Affairs," World Politics 37 (October 1984), pp. 1-23.
56. For an analysis of international regulations on trade in toxic waste, see Christoph Hilz and
John R. Ehrenfeld, "Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes: A Comparative Analysis of
Policy Options to Control the International Waste Trade," International Environmental Affairs 3
(Winter 1991), pp. 26-63.
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Environmental institutions 369
suffer, is that it does not take into account the relative importance of individual
institutions. A 50 percent change toward the goals specified in the Framework
Convention on Global Climate Change may be vastly more important from an
overall environmental perspective than making the Rhine habitable for salmon
by the year 2000—the goal of the Rhine Action Program.
In summary, the outcome to be explained in terms of the effect of
international institutions can be defined as goal attainment: that is, the
difference (over time or across cases) between actor behavior or the state of the
natural environment along dimensions defined by institutional goals and end
points defined by institutional goals. The validity of this variable derives from
its close relation to the notion of problem solving. Due to the measurement
problems discussed above, the reliability of the collected data will normally be
less than perfect, but it can be enhanced by using ordinal-scaled scores with
only a few categories (e.g., low, medium, and high goal attainment).
Measuring the effect and effectiveness of institutions
The extent to which the existence or operation of the institution per se
accounts for variation in goal attainment provides the measure of the effect of
an institution on goal attainment. The measurement of institutional effect is
more difficult than the measurement of goal attainment because it involves an
element of causal analysis. An institution has an effect to the degree that we
can reject the null hypothesis, which holds that goal attainment would, ceteris
paribus, not be different in the absence of the institution.
To give a simple example, assume that we observe a 25 percent reduction
across the board in the major pollution parameters of the Rhine, whereas a 50
percent reduction is the goal of the institution regulating pollution of the
Rhine. Hence the degree of goal attainment is 50 percent (or medium). To
what degree can this progress be attributed to the existence or operation of the
Rhine institution? Let us assume that, based on the study of various competing
explanations for this progress, we find that international regulations account
for half of the progress. In this case, we may conclude that the Rhine riparians
can rightly claim a medium degree of success in terms of achieving the
environmental goal and that international regulations account for half of this
progress. The other half may be explained, for example, by changes in the
production technology of chemical firms along the Rhine that would have
occurred irrespective of international regulations.
How can we arrive at such a result? As the above example suggests, the key is
to sort out the effects of exogenous (noninstitutional) and endogenous
(institutional) variables on goal attainment. The cause of variation in goal
attainment may not be environmental institutions but instead the variation of
preferences and power structures, which can result from political and economic
changes, changes in the natural environment, technological innovation, popula-
tion growth, positive or negative spillovers from other international or national
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institutions, and other variables. Controlling for the effect of preferences and
power structures on the relationship between institutions and goal attainment
is crucial not only for obtaining valid and reliable data on institutional effect
but also because it addresses the wider theoretical debate about the role of
institutions in international politics.
The task will be comparatively easy if we conduct a case study where power
structures and preferences remain constant over time and an institution comes
into being along the way or changes its features. In this case, we can argue that
the institution is largely the cause of the variation in goal attainment we may
observe. Mitchell, for example, shows that compliance with international
regulations on intentional oil pollution of the sea increased after these
regulations changed. Earlier regulations had required tanker operators to limit
their oil discharges, whereas the new regulations required the installation of
specific pollution reduction equipment on tankers. Mitchell notes that the
actors and types of activity involved, the concentration of costs and benefits of
regulations across actors, and the binding nature and legitimacy of the
agreements remained constant over time. Because the new regulations were
more expensive for tanker operators than the old regulations, one would expect
lower levels of compliance. The observation that the opposite occurred is
attributed to the fact that the new regulations have increased transparency,
reduced the implementation costs of governments, and changed the incentives
of shipping companies and crews by enabling better enforcement of the rules.57
In cases where preferences and power structures change over time or across
cases, the measurement of institutional effect will be more difficult. However,
we can control for the influence of preferences and power structures within a
game-theoretic framework. This approach suffers from well-known problems,
such as identifying ex ante preferences.58 To avoid this problem, we can infer
preferences from data on environmental vulnerability and the costs of
particular environmental regulations.59 Even less than perfect results can direct
our attention to critical situations where institutions could make a difference or
where they are likely to have little effect.
In assurance games, for example, two or more equilibria are possible. As a
result, governments may encounter great difficulties in trying to settle on one
equilibrium. But once an equilibrium is reached, no actor has an incentive to
make a change in behavior. In this case, successful cooperation does not
require institutions that have a large monitoring and enforcement capacity.
The principal problem is to achieve cooperation, not to sustain it. This implies
57. Ronald B. Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution and Treaty
Compliance," International Organization 48 (Summer 1994), pp. 425-58.
58. See, for example, James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political
Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
59. For an innovative approach to measuring ex ante preferences, which is based on indicators of
environmental vulnerability and costs of environmental regulation, see Detlef Sprinz and Tapai
Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," Interna-
tional Organization 48 (Winter 1994), pp. 77-105.
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Environmental institutions 371
that, even if we observe a correlation between the existence or operation of an
institution and goal attainment, the causal effect of the institution is likely to be
small, provided that the structure of the game has remained constant. The
more recent phase of the ozone case may be regarded as an assurance game. As
it became clear that an international ban on CFCs would be adopted, the
principal CFC producers began to consider the ban as beneficial because it
would create a large market for more profitable CFC substitutes. Hence, they
lost any incentive to cheat on such a ban.
In prisoners' dilemma games, actors have a strong incentive to defect
clandestinely. Under these circumstances, institutions that install strategies of
strict reciprocity and have monitoring and enforcement procedures will
facilitate cooperation.60 If, under these conditions, we observe a correlation
between changes in the monitoring, enforcement, or reciprocity mechanisms of
an institution and goal attainment, we have reason to suspect a causal
relationship between the institution and goal attainment. The oil pollution case
discussed above is such an example. The technical equipment to be installed on
tankers is expensive. Consequently, those actors who manage to circumvent the
regulations can gain a competitive advantage.
In zero-sum games and situations of harmony, institutions are likely to play a
marginal role or will not be established in the first place. In zero-sum games,
cooperation achieves no joint gains. A stable cooperative equilibrium defines
situations of harmony: no actor has an incentive to defect, no matter what the
other actors do. For example, the Dutch city of Rotterdam concluded
agreements with various chemical firms along the Rhine in Germany and
Switzerland. The Dutch hailed the ensuing emission reductions by these firms
as a success. But critics have argued that the chemical companies concerned
were planning to cut their pollution anyhow and that the agreements with
Rotterdam were concluded merely for public relations purposes.61
In controlling the impact of power structures, we have to assess the degree to
which we should attribute variation in goal attainment to the willingness of
powerful states to deploy positive or negative incentives to modify the behavior
of other actors in a particular direction. Scholars have often explained variation
of collective outcomes in international trade and finance in these terms.62 In
environmental politics, it has been widely argued that the blanket moratorium
adopted by the International Whaling Commission in 1982 has achieved its goal
largely because the United States threatened sanctions against violators of the
moratorium.63
60. Duncan Snidal, "Coordination Versus Prisoner's Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes," American Political Science Review 74 (December 1985), pp. 923^42.
61. Personal interview with Walter Jiilich, Internationale Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Wasserwerke
im Rheineinzugsgebiet (International Association of Waterworks in the Rhine Basin), Amster-
dam, December 1993.
62. Keohane, After Hegemony.
63. Steinar Andresen, "Science and Politics in the International Management of Whales,"
Marine Policy 13 (April 1989), pp. 99-117.
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The method we use to assess the effect of institutions is a secondary issue. It
will depend largely on the available data. If valid and reliable hard data on goal
attainment, institutions, and control variables are available and if we have
enough observations, we can use statistical analysis. We may, for example,
define institutions or their features as a dummy variable (an institution or a
feature exists or does not exist) and use multivariate analysis to assess the effect
of institutions on goal attainment. In such an analysis, we control exogenous
variables by including them in multiple regression models or time-series
analysis. Thomas Widmer, for example, uses the Box-Tiao method to examine
the effect of Swiss governmental regulations on sulfur dioxide emissions.64
Christopher Lenhardt evaluates the effect of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) on developing country trade, employing a more simple
statistical technique.65 Dieter Ruloff and Gerald Schneider use time-series
analysis to assess the effect of various political events on conflict and
cooperation between the two superpowers.66 Glenn Stevenson applies sophisti-
cated econometric methods to examine whether Swiss alpine grazing lands are
more successfully managed under common property or under private property
regimes.67
Analysts have rarely used statistical methods to study the effect of institu-
tions in international environmental politics. These methods require a larger
number of observations, which limits the cases to which they may be applied.
Even Stevenson's analysis, which compares 245 grazing areas, quickly produces
insignificant results as he increases the number of control variables. In the end,
he is unable to offer even simple advice to Swiss farmers on what form of
property rights would be more beneficial to them.68 The number of interna-
tional regulations over time and across cases tends to be small, and valid and
reliable data are often difficult to find. It would seem, however, that we could
apply statistical methods in cases where environmental regulations have a long
history. Based on a qualitative analysis, I argue elsewhere that the cause of the
modest chloride reductions of the Rhine riparians since the late 1980s is the
decline of potash and coal mines and of soda factories along the river, rather
than the international regulation of chloride emissions. Time-series analysis of
64. Thomas Widmer, Evaluation von Massnahmen zur Luftreinhaltepolitik in der Schweiz
(Evaluation of clean-air policy in Switzerland) (Chur, Switzerland: Verlag Riiegger, 1991). The
Box-Tiao method was proposed by George E. P. Box and George C. Tiao, "Intervention Analysis
with Applications to Economic and Environmental Problems," Journal of the American Statistical
Association 70 (March 1975), pp. 70-79.
65. W. Christopher Lenhardt, "International Trade and Measuring the GATT Regime Effect
on Developing Country Trade," paper presented at the annual convention of the International
Studies Association, Acapulco, Mexico, 23-27 March 1993.
66. Dieter Ruloff and Gerald Schneider, "Gorby, Grit, or Rambo: A Quantitative Appraisal of
the End of the Cold War," paper prepared for the annual convention of the International Studies
Association, Atlanta, Georgia, 31 March—4 April 1992.
67. Glenn G. Stevenson, Common Property Economics: A General Theory and Land Use
Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
68. Ibid.
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chloride emissions (data back to 1885 are available) could produce similar,
perhaps even more precise, results.69
For qualitative assessments of institutional effect, we rely on process tracing
or thick description. This means developing detailed narrative accounts that
describe the causal chains leading from institutions to goal attainment and
focus in particular on critical decision-making points. Counterfactual analysis,
which is essentially a thought experiment,70 enhances causal claims that are
made in this regard. Counterfactual analysis explores what goal attainment
might have looked like in the absence of a given institution.
If we can demonstrate, through statistical analysis or qualitative methods,
that preferences or power structures that are independent of an international
institution cause variation in goal attainment, the institution has no effect. In
the stratospheric ozone case, for example, the institution has no effect if we can
prove that CFC producers have cut their production only because they
expected higher profits from the sale of CFC substitutes than from the sale of
CFCs, irrespective of what happened in terms of international regulation. We
might also argue, however, that the regulatory effort, spurred by the discovery
of the ozone hole, changed the incentives of CFC producers and caused them
to invest in research on CFC substitutes. This research led to CFC substitutes,
whose market value is higher. If there had been no international regulatory
effort, CFC substitutes would have come on the market much later and CFC
production would have diminished at a lower rate.71 If we can disconfirm the
null hypothesis in part through such an argument, we must try to assess the
relative weight of institutional and noninstitutional explanatory variables.
The ozone example suggests that measurements of institutional effect will
rarely be clear cut and totally reliable, because behavior and environmental
outcomes are often due to multiple causes and because we cannot control
history as we do laboratory events. Such measurements will always contain an
element of judgment. Independent evaluations of the same institution along
the lines proposed here and an intensified debate about critical data among
researchers will, therefore, be important. An additional strategy to enhance the
reliability of institutional effect scores is to submit them to policymakers and
experts for independent review.
Ideally, the assessment of institutional effect will produce ordinal-scaled
scores indicating the degree to which institutions affect goal attainment over
time or across cases. The data on goal attainment and institutional effect can
69. Thomas Bernauer, "International Financing of Environmental Protection."
70. See James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World
Politics 43 (January 1991), pp. 169-95; and David Dessler, "Beyond Correlations: Toward a Causal
Theory of War," International Studies Quarterly 35 (September 1991), pp. 337-55. For a
comprehensive treatment of qualitative methods, see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney
Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1994).
71. For an analysis of the ozone case, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy; and Parson, "Protecting
the Ozone Layer."
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then be used to form a score of institutional effectiveness. The most effective
institutions will be those where both the degree of goal attainment and the
degree of institutional effect are high. The least successful institutions will be
those where goal attainment and institutional effect are low. Such an index will
be comparable over time and across cases. It might indicate, for example, that
the institution that oversees long-range transboundary air pollution in Europe
has, in the past few years, been more effective than the international whaling
institution was in the 1960s.
Institutional design and the effectiveness of institutions
The final step in the analysis consists of examining the implications of
institutional design for institutional effectiveness. In the preceding section, we
focused on the extent to which variation in goal attainment can be explained by
the existence or operation of institutions. Now we pose questions about the
degree to which particular features of institutions are responsible for variation
in the performance of these institutions.
As noted earlier, political scientists and others have put forth a plethora of
propositions as to which types of institutions are likely to be more effective. To
render meaningful quantitative or qualitative inference about the conse-
quences of institutional design possible, we must focus on a small number of
institutional design variables. From a theoretical viewpoint, this reduction in
the number of explanatory variables should aim at reducing the number of ad
hoc propositions and focus on variables we can integrate into a coherent
theoretical argument. This approach may seem somewhat less attractive to the
policymaker than to the social scientist interested in systematic theory building.
However, if we cannot determine the causal relationships correctly, we cannot
offer good advice to policymakers. The methodology for examining the impact
of institutional design on institutional effectiveness is similar to that used in the
preceding step. Depending on the available data, our assessment may rely on
statistical analysis or on process tracing or thick description.
The focus on institutional design variables that we derive from rational-
choice theory is likely to produce relatively coherent explanations. A large body
of rational-choice literature in political science and economics explains how
individual choices are aggregated into collective decisions through voting rules
or other mechanisms and how variables such as the extent and distribution of
information on actor intentions and behavior influence the possibilities of
successful cooperation.72 Decision rules, membership conditions, and the
compliance system of institutions are among the more important institutional
72. See, for example, Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987); Todd Sandier, Collective Action: Theory and Applications (Ann Arbor: The
University of Michigan Press, 1992); Peter C. Ordeshook, Game Theory and Political Theory: An
Introduction (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Kydd and Snidal, "Progress in
Game-Theoretical Analysis of International Regimes."
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design dimensions. They influence the effectiveness of institutions by shaping
the functions that these institutions perform.
We could hypothesize, for example, that majority voting rules combined with
open membership are likely to make an institution more effective. Majority
voting forces states to reveal their preferences. Thus, it exposes environmental
laggards more clearly. It allows more progressive states and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) to set the goals and push the laggards forward through
specifically targeted punishments or rewards. Moreover, even if the more
progressive states move ahead while overruled states drag their feet, the overall
outcome in terms of goal attainment may often be superior to a lowest common
denominator approach.
We can make such an argument for the international whaling institution.
Because this institution is open to any state, advocates of a total ban on whaling
were able to bring many nonwhaling nations into the International Whaling
Commission. Most of the newcomers supported a total ban. The majority
voting rule of the commission thus permitted the strengthened antiwhaling
coalition to overrule laggard states such as Japan and Norway and adopt a
blanket moratorium in 1982 with a two-thirds majority.73 Whether this change
has enhanced the effectiveness of the institution requires further study.
Another case where variation in voting rules may account for institutional
effectiveness is the European Community and its successor, the EU. In this
case, we could examine whether the greater frequency of majority decision
making since the adoption of the Maastricht treaty has changed the effective-
ness of EU environmental regulations.74 The explanatory weight of voting rules
might be smaller, however, if we conduct larger-scale comparative work,
because most environmental institutions operate with the consensus rule.
Another hypothesis is that those institutions whose design generates a higher
extent and intensity of information flows (monitoring) at low cost are likely to
be more effective under prisoners' dilemma conditions. Monitoring and
reporting procedures of the International Labor Office, the International
Monetary Fund, or the GATT (now the World Trade Organization) are
interesting cases where the design of the compliance system is likely to have
implications for the effectiveness of the institution.75 Mitchell's study on
intentional oil pollution argues that changes in the design of the compliance
system increased compliance (the same would seem to hold for effectiveness)
73. See M. J. Peterson, "Whalers, Cetologists, Environmentalists, and the International
Management of Whaling"; and Asgrimsson, "Developments Leading to the 1982 Decision of the
International Whaling Commission for a Zero Catch Quota 1986-90."
74. For an analysis of European Community/Union environmental policy from an institutional-
ist perspective, see Philipp M. Hildebrand, "The European Community's Environmental Policy,
1957-'1992': From Incidental Measures to an International Regime," in David Judge, ed.,^4 Green
Dimension for the European Community: Political Issues and Processes (London: Frank Cass, 1993).
75. See, for example, Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance;
Chayes and Chayes, "On Compliance"; and Dan Kovenock and Marie Thursby, "GATT, Dispute
Settlement, and Cooperation," Economics and Politics 4 (July 1992), pp. 151-70.
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
00
02
84
23
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
31
:0
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
376 International Organization
because they increased transparency and reduced the costs of monitoring and
enforcement. The generalizable institutional design lesson involved is that
regulations that give practical ability and legal authority to implement
regulations to those actors with the greatest incentive to comply and monitor
and enforce regulations are likely to be more effective.76
These two examples offer propositions we need to test further, and the list is
far from complete. Additional propositions worth analysis might relate to the
nature of international secretariats, the organization of scientific input, or the
scope of the institutional agenda.77 Students of domestic institutions have
carried out the most systematic research on the consequences of institutional
design for the management of natural resources and environmental protection.
Many of the propositions that this research has generated—for example, that
institutional effectiveness increases with the congruence of rules and local
conditions, the access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms, or the clear
definition of property rights—appear compatible with a rational-choice argu-
ment. Keohane, McGinnis, and Ostrom have explored how some of these
propositions could be translated to the international level.78 But so far no
analysts have undertaken a systematic empirical assessment. Hence the most
interesting and potentially rewarding research on the effect of international
environmental institutions lies in the future.
Conclusion
We have made substantial progress in understanding the conditions under
which states are able to establish international institutions to protect the
environment. We have been less successful in explaining the performance of
these institutions once they have been established. Many analysts of interna-
tional politics believe that the existence or operation of international institu-
tions, and good institutional design in particular, can contribute to progress in
environmental protection. Others contend that, as long as there is no
environmental leviathan, the distribution of power and the interests of key
actors account for collective outcomes in international relations. Systematic
empirical research into the effect of international environmental institutions
contributes to international relations theory by assessing the two competing
claims. It may also generate practical advice to policymakers by evaluating
whether decision makers, NGOs, or other actors should preferably try to
manipulate power structures and preferences to achieve their goals, or whether
they can also facilitate environmental protection by improving the design of
international institutions and, if so, how.
76. Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters."
77. A preliminary discussion of such design dimensions can be found in Wettestad, Institutional
Design and the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes.
78. Keohane, McGinnis, and Ostrom, Proceedings of a Conference on Linking Local and Global
Commons.
ht
tp
s:
//
do
i.o
rg
/1
0.
10
17
/S
00
20
81
83
00
02
84
23
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e.
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f B
as
el
 L
ib
ra
ry
, o
n 
11
 Ju
l 2
01
7 
at
 0
7:
31
:0
7,
 s
ub
je
ct
 to
 th
e 
C
am
br
id
ge
 C
or
e 
te
rm
s 
of
 u
se
, a
va
ila
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
ps
:/
w
w
w
.c
am
br
id
ge
.o
rg
/c
or
e/
te
rm
s.
Environmental institutions 377
Current research on the effect of international environmental institutions
suffers from two deficiencies. Dependent variables (institutional effect, effec-
tiveness, efficiency, etc.) and explanatory variables (institutions and their
features) are ill-defined, contested, and rarely married to a coherent theory.
Second, analysts have focused on whether the existence or operation of
institutions per se has an effect on actor behavior and other outcomes. Virtually
no work has offered generalizable and empirically substantiated knowledge
regarding which institutional design variables are critical to the success or
failure of institutions under specific conditions.
This article has outlined a positive research strategy that may serve as a basis
for more systematic and policy-relevant research on the effect of international
environmental institutions. The proposed research strategy consists of three
steps. First, we measure the outcomes to be explained in terms of goal
attainment, denned as the difference between actor behavior or the state of the
natural environment on dimensions defined by institutional goals and end
points denned by institutional goals. Second, we assess the effect of an
institution in terms of the extent to which the institution has, ceteris paribus,
contributed to variation in goal attainment. We transform these two variables
into a score of institutional effectiveness. Third, we analyze the relationship
between institutional effectiveness and particular institutional design variables,
for example decision rules, membership conditions, or the compliance system.
This research strategy is rather demanding, and we may have to modify parts
of it as empirical research continues. Moreover, I have conceptualized
explanatory and dependent variables quite narrowly to keep the task manage-
able. This approach may evoke criticism from analysts who have one foot in the
policy world. Unfortunately, however, we cannot offer good policy advice
before we clearly understand the causal relationships between institutional
design options and the performance of institutions. So far, we have not reached
this point.
The proposed research strategy provides a starting point for more rigorous
and comparable case studies. These case studies are required to sharpen the
research design and generate new hypotheses. The strategy can also serve as a
starting point for larger-scale comparative research. Such research is indispens-
able to arrive at generalizable propositions about necessary or sufficient
conditions for the effectiveness of international institutions. The United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 and the
scholarly activity it has spurred have generated large amounts of data on
international environmental institutions, the associated behavior of govern-
ments and other actors, and changes in the natural environment. And more
data are yet to come, not least from the expanding activities of international
organizations and NGOs. If we can shape our analytical concepts, propositions,
and research strategies properly, we could make an important contribution to
international relations theory and also facilitate the protection of the earth's
environment.
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